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TOWARD AN AUGUSTINIAN LIBERALISM
Paul J. Weithman

Concern with the vice of pride is often thought contrary to the spirit of
liberalism. Among the virtues often ascribed to liberal political institutions
is their encouragement of self-assertion and a sense of self-esteem. Moreover
Judith Shklar has argued, in Ordinary Vices, that liberalism requires neglect
of pride and of the other deadly sins of medieval Christianity. Instead, she
argues, liberals properly concern themselves with restraining the vices that
she, following Montaigne, dubs ordinary-cruelty, treachery, snobbery, and
hypocrisy.
In this paper I argue, on the contrary, that the vice of pride poses political
problems in a liberal democracy. A properly Christian concern with checking
the vice of pride, I argue, gives Christians reason to embrace political liberalism. More specifically, I argue that observing liberal constraints on political
advocacy ameliorates some of the political problems to which pride gives
rise. The liberalism that results has some claim to be called "Augustinian,"
for Augustine thought pride the worst of the vices and thought its restraint
the primary function of political authority.

The title of this paper no doubt elicits some measure of surprise and confusion, for Augustine's name and his doctrines are no longer the common
coin in political philosophy that they once were. l Moreover, the term "Augustinian liberalism" will strike those familiar with Augustine's politics-as
he developed them during the Donatist controversy,2 for example-as oxymoronic. The political theories historically associated with Augustine and
Augustinianism have not, after all, been notably tolerant. Finally, the qualities
of character liberalism fosters-among them tolerance and self-assertionmight be thought antithetical to Augustinian Christianity. There are, however,
arguments to support political liberalism that can appropriately be described
as Augustinian and the aim of this paper is to lay them out. Before turning
to them, it will prove helpful to state what I mean by the term "political
liberalism" and to say to whom I am offering these Augustinian arguments.

I
"Liberalism" has been and continues to be used to denote a widely extended
family of political and philosophical positions that differ in significant respects. The element common to this family is often said to be an overriding
concern for the rule of law and for the personal and political liberties of
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conscience, speech, assembly and of the press. The common element is sometimes said to be a commitment to rights that guarantee freedom to exercise
these liberties. 3 Still others characterize liberalism by the political agenda
that these philosophical positions are deemed to entail. My own working
characterization, however, takes as central to political liberalism4 neither
rights, liberties nor agenda, but a criterion of the legitimate exercise of public
power.s
Of course it is not peculiar to liberalism to argue that power ought only to
be exercised legitimately. But there are distinctively liberal principles of
political legitimacy, principles that restrict the reasons and values that can be
appealed to when justifying the exercise of public power if that exercise is
to be legitimate. Political liberalism as I shall understand it is a position
characterized by fidelity to one or another of the members of this family of
liberal principles of political legitimacy. An adequate characterization of
political liberalism as I understand it therefore requires adequate characterization of what is common to the restrictions various liberal principles of
legitimacy impose.
Jeremy Waldron has located at the foundations of liberalism the "demand
that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the
tribunal of each person's understanding. "6 This demand suggests that liberal
principles of political legitimacy have in common their insistence that exercises of public power are legitimate only if they can be justified in terms that
"explain [themselves]" to every citizen. David Lyons makes a similar suggestion, saying that the justification of public policy must be "accessible" to
everyone.'
These broad characterizations leave ample scope for disagreement among
liberals about which values and principles do and which do not legitimate the
exercise of public power; the literature of recent liberalism reflects this disagreement. John Rawls inclines to the view that public power is legitimately
exercised only when it can be justified by appeal to a range of values on
which all could agree and which are peculiar to what he calls "the domain
of the political. "8 Robert Audi's arguments suggest that he thinks exercises
of power legitimate only when they can be justified by what he calls "secular
reasons"; to appeal to religious values or principles is to offer reasons that
not all citizens do or could accept. But Audi seems not to insist, as Rawls
does, that legitimating reasons appeal only to values that are distinctively
political. 9 The great Catholic liberal John Courtney Murray, on the other
hand, seems to have held that some religious propositions and values can
legitimate the use of public power in the United States because he thought
that there are some religious values or propositions all Americans, at least,
could come to accept.lO
Ample room also remains for disagreement about those to whom the exer-
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cise of power must be justified or justifiable. Rawls suggests that such exercise need by judged legitimate only by those who are or are trying to be
reasonable. II Bruce Ackerman seems to think that agreement must be reached
among all contending parties whether or not they regard one another as
reasonable. Still others who are liberal by Waldron's criterion-Seyla
Benhabib, for example-worry that any standards of reasonableness framed
prior to the process of justification tend uncritically to legitimate the status
quo and so do not really legitimate at al1. 12
Fortunately, I need not adjudicate among competing liberal principles of
political legitimacy. For my purposes, it suffices to note that political liberalism addresses those who live in a society of moral, religious or philosophical pluralism and attempts to narrow their disagreement about the use of
public power. It attempts to do so by defending restrictions on the invocation
of moral, philosophical or religious beliefs and values to legitimate the exercise of public power. The restrictions on beliefs and values are to be restrictions on which all, or all reasonable, citizens could come to agree because
liberalism is premised on the view that at least the most significant exercises
of public power must be justifiable to all or to the reasonable.
In what follows, I shall be concerned with the implications of political
liberalism for political advocacy, for citizens' advocacy and defense of the
use of public power. For a citizen to be a liberal requires that her political
advocacy conform to one or another liberal principle of political legitimacy.
The liberal citizen therefore adduces no reasons for the exercise of public
power that would render that exercise illegitimate by the standards of one or
another liberal principle of political legitimacy. A Rawlsian liberal would
appeal only to political values in her political advocacy, an Audian liberal
would not appeal to religious reasons and a Murrayan liberal, while permitted
appeal to some religious beliefs, would not appeal to narrowly sectarian
propositions or to those that depend upon revelation. I shall argue that there
are Augustinian reasons for imposing some liberal restrictions on one's political advocacy and defense and so to be a political liberal, provided others
do likewise. Before proceeding, however, some qualifications and explanations are in order.
First, I have in mind only political advocacy that is recognizably argumentative. Verbal but non-argumentative political advocacy, as is found in drama,
poetry, music and graffiti,13 to take but four examples, would have to be
considered in a full theory of legitimacy and political advocacy. So too would
the non-verbal political expression of the visual arts, dance, flagburning and
vigils of silent prayer. But having noted their importance, I shall prove myself
no exception to the unfortunate philosophical trend of ignoring non-argumentative political expression.
Second, I am concerned only with political advocacy by ordinary citizens.
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The role of judges whose opinions have the force of precedent, for example,
no doubt imposes special requirements on those who happen to be judges,
especially on religious jurists. Judicial advocacy and defense of the exercise
of public power therefore requires special treatment and would exceed the
scope of this paper.14
Third, I am not going to argue that citizens need in fact be moved by the
reasons they adduce for the exercise of political power. A citizen counts as a
liberal, in my view, if the argument in which her advocacy consists is liberal;
this is compatible with her being moved even by highly idiosyncratic religious, philosophical or moral views.l~
Finally, I am not going to argue that there are overriding Augustinian
reasons to be a political liberal, just that there are good Augustinian reasons.
I therefore leave aside the very difficult question of whether someone whose
political advocacy is illiberal thereby violates a moral obligation or fails to
be a good citizen.
My arguments are intended to show that Christians have reason to accept
some form of political liberalism. The arguments are premised on an Augustinian analysis of pride. I shall argue that Christians, because they have
religious reasons to curb their pride, have reason to be concerned with the
political manifestations of that vice and that Christians therefore have reasons
to value the humility and restraint fostered by conforming their political
advocacy to a liberal principle of political legitimacy if others do the same.
Further, if pride is understood according to this Augustinian analysis, all and
not just Christians have reasons to check their pride. All, therefore, have
reasons to value the humbling and restraining effects of political liberalism.
My arguments linking liberalism and concern with pride are not intended
to move those in all times and places. They are directed at those who live in
what might be called maturely pluralistic democratic societies. These are
societies with a democratic political culture and democratic institutions and
traditions. They are characterized by what Rawls has called "the fact of
pluralism": they are societies composed of those who adhere to diverse philosophical, religious and moral conceptions of the good life. They are, finally,
societies without institutional barriers that prevent adherents of minority
views from learning enough about their own or the democratic tradition to
engage in reasoned political argument. Augustinians in societies with histories of minority repression or without democratic institutions may have good
reason to be liberals, but they do not have the reasons to which I shall appeal.

II
Augustine's views on the origin and purposes of political society and on
the legitimate uses of political authority are extremely complex. I cannot do
them justice here; surely the political liberalism for which I will argue departs
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significantly from Augustine's political thought in some respects. 16 Even so,
labelling this liberalism Augustinian is not without fidelity to Augustine's
own views or to the tradition of their interpretation.
First, Augustine himself numbered the human tendency to pride among the
legacies of original sin. He believed that political authority was instituted as
a consequence of and a remedy for original sin and he numbered among the
primary functions of political authority the humbling of its subjects. 17 Indeed
it is in part because Augustinian politics ascribes this function to political
authority that liberals-most notably Judith Shklar l8 -have tried to distance
themselves from it and to supplant an Augustinian moral psychology stressing
pride with an alternative psychology thought more congenial to liberalism. I
want to suggest, on the contrary, that a concern with the vice of pride and
with the consequent need for humility provide reasons for accepting political
liberalism as it is discussed in the previous section. This stress on the humbling function of political liberalism qualifies the liberalism defended as
Augustinian.
Moreover, that liberalism is Augustinian insofar as the account of pride on
which it is premised is of Augustinian provenance: the essentials of that
account are laid out in Augustine's works. Unfortunately, Augustine's own
account is somewhat unsystematic. Its central elements were later masterfully
combined and harmonized by Aquinas l9 and it is therefore on Aquinas's
developed account of Augustinian ideas about pride that I rely.
The pride that Christianity has traditionally considered the deadliest of the
deadly sins is often thought of as contempt of God or as a desire to cast God
down and to put oneself in His place. The paradigms of pride so conceived
are Adam and Eve in their commission of original sin and Milton's Lucifer
in his rebellion against Divine sovereignty. Aquinas thinks that human beings
do sometimes act from intentional contempt of God and His law. He is,
however, committed to the view that pride is a pervasive moral phenomenon,
found in a wide variety of faulty human acts. 20
Pride, Aquinas says, is a failure to subject oneself to God and to the rules
He has ordained. 2 ! Aquinas thinks that a failure to observe God's commands
and a turning away from God toward what Aquinas calls "commutable goods"
is the very nature of sin. He therefore thinks that every sin is, in effect, a
failure properly to subject oneself to God; he concludes that every sin however motivated and whatever its object is, in effect, a sin of pride.
But this account is insufficient for Aquinas's purposes. While it does explain a rather weak way in which pride is present in every sinful act, Aquinas
wants an account of pride that has explanatory power, one in which pride
explains sinful acts and is not merely shown by them. Some of this explanatory power is provided by Aquinas's account of how pride removes impediments to immoral action. Aquinas thinks that intentional violation of moral
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rules requires some explanation. Here, he thinks, pride can have an explanatory role, for among the manifestations of pride is thinking oneself above
such rules. Pride can thus remove the impediment to sin posed by a prima
facie inclination to observe moral rules.
Even this account, however, is not enough. Aquinas thinks that pride is not
only present in or explains many sinful acts, but also motivates them.
Aquinas's commitment to pride's pervasiveness as a motive therefore requires
a more nuanced account, one that will accommodate the Miltonian view of
pride but also one which shows how wide a variety of acts pride can lead
agents to perform. The key to this account is Aquinas's specification of
pride's characteristic motive.
Aquinas argues that the characteristic motive of acts of pride is an undue
desire for what he calls "one's own excellence." He does not have in mind
an undue desire for one's own perfection or for the fulfillment of one's
potential. Rather acts of pride are primarily motivated by an undue desire for
preeminence or superiority. This undue desire for preeminence or superiority
can, Aquinas concedes, be accompanied by a contempt for those over whom
superiority is sought. This contempt can be for God and His commands; but,
Aquinas insists, pride can also engender contempt for other human beings. 22
It is, however, crucial to Aquinas's account of pride that contempt, whether
for God or man, is not the motive primarily associated with pride. The primary motive remains undue desire for preeminence. To appreciate the variety
of acts pride can engender, it is necessary to appreciate the variety of acts
one could be led to perform by such a desire. This undue desire can show
itself in two ways.
An undue desire for superiority, Aquinas would say, is sometimes a desire
for undue superiority, a desire for moral, spiritual or intellectual goods that
human beings cannot attain. It is to this undue desire for superiority or
preeminence that Aquinas would appeal to explain how acts of pride can be
attempts to attain equality with God or to usurp His place: the goods desired
are goods that properly belong only to God and it is an essay in usurpation
for a human being to desire them for herself. Most often, Aquinas believes,
the usurpation of God's place is unintentional and acts attributable to pride
are not chosen under descriptions that refer to usurpation. They are instead
chosen from a desire for the moral, spiritual or intellectual good in question.
What makes the consequent acts acts of pride is that the goods desired are
desired as a means to superiority.
Adam and Eve's original sin therefore exemplified extraordinary pride.
Adam and Eve, Aquinas says, wanted to be like God inasmuch as they wanted
the undue spiritual good of being able to prescribe moral rules for themselves. 23 The extremity of their pride, he thinks, consisted in their knowingly
trying to be like God. Thus does Aquinas's account enable him to accommo-
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date the Miltonian view; thus also does it make of the Miltonian view an
extreme and not a typical case of pride.
Pride of this first sort may be accompanied by a contempt for God, since
the proud person implicitly denigrates Him in the attempt to make herself in
some respect His equal. Just as it is rare for someone knowingly to try to
usurp God's place, so it is rare, Aquinas thinks, for someone consciously to
hold God in contempt. Indeed his interpretation of the Fall, according to which
Adam and Eve wanted to make moral rules for themselves, suggests as much.
If they were contemptuous at all, Aquinas's interpretation suggests, their contempt was primarily for God's commands and only secondarily for the God who
commanded. And even in Adam and Eve's case, their original sin was motivated
not by their contempt, but by desire for their own superiority.
Aquinas also argues that there is a second sort of undue desire for superiority or preeminence, an undue desire to be superior to other human beings
in some respect or for the power over others that superiority often confers.24
A vice closely related to pride so understood, Aquinas says, is that of vainglory; the vainglorious person is moved by a desire that others praise and
acknowledge her preeminence and power. Aquinas does not, however, think
that the objects of vainglory and of this second sort of pride-superiority and
power, praise and acknowledgement-are the intended objects of many of
the acts properly described as acts of pride or vainglory. Few acts of these
vices, Aquinas would say, are chosen from a desire for these objects that the
agent herself recognizes .. Often acts of pride and vainglory masquerade as
acts of other vices-acts of seizing more money than one needs or is one's
due, or foolhardy acts on the battlefield. What makes the act in question one
of pride or vainglory rather than of injustice, intemperance or rashness is that
an undue desire for superiority, power or praise is the appropriate explanation
for seeking too much money or taking too many risks in battle. Because
people can excel or gain the advantage over others in so many ways and by
the use of so many objects from possessions to battlefield victories, pride of
the second sort can, like pride of the first sort, lead the proud person to
perform any of a variety of sinful acts.
Pride of the second sort, like pride of the first, can be accompanied by
contempt. Attempts to secure preeminence over others can be accompanied
by contempt for them, contempt for God or contempt for moral rules. But
Aquinas thinks that what makes an act one of pride is the role that desire for
one's own superiority plays in that act's explanation.
In summary, then, Aquinas therefore argues that in one sense, every sin
regardless of agent or motive, is a sin of pride. He further argues that pride
is needed to explain someone's knowing violation of a moral rule. And
Aquinas argues that, because so many wrong acts can be means to attaining
superiority, an undue desire for one's own superiority can motivate an agent
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to perform any or many of a wide variety of wrong acts. Indeed Aquinas says
that pride can motivate someone to a wrong act of any kind.
Despite the fact that pride can explain so wide a variety of human failure,
there are classes or "species" into which Aquinas thinks acts of pride can be
sorted: imputing to oneself some good one really does not have, reputing oneself
to have attained some good on one's own merits, failing to acknowledge the
excellence or help of another in the attainment of some good and seeking to
excel others in some material, moral, intellectual or spiritual good that one
should have in the same way they do. Aquinas describes these classes of acts
rather abstractly, but it is plausible that acts that fall into them are acts one
would perform to usurp God's place, to gain preeminence over others or to
assure oneself of one's own superiority. His description of the classes of acts
associated with vainglory is more concrete; he numbers among what he calls
the "daughters" of vainglory hypocrisy, discord, contention and pertinacity.
Aquinas's analysis indicates how pride motivates offenses against God and
other human beings. The links he sees among contempt for rules, contempt
for God and man, and desire for superiority over either or both suggest the
corrosive effects of pride on the passions of the proud person. Certainly
contempt for moral rules and a belief that one is above them can lead, not
only to their violation, but also to the habit of excusing oneself for the
violations. This, in tum, inhibits proper function of the moral sentiments of
guilt and shame. Contempt for moral rules can also prevent proper responses
to the good works of others that are worthy of admiration; and the habit of
excusing oneself for having acted badly makes it more difficult properly to
appreciate forgiveness granted by others. Contempt for others distorts the
moral sentiments so that sympathy, pity and remorse are not properly felt on
the occasions that call for them. Insofar as the proper operation of the moral
passions is part of a well-lived human life and contempt born of pride impedes
them, pride is a fault both the religious and the non-religious have reason to
avoid.
There are several features of Aquinas's account that are especially worthy
of mention.
First, Aquinas thinks that appeal to pride is often required to complete the
explanation of wrong action; in the vast majority of such cases, however, the
agent believes herself motivated by interests or desires other than those associated with pride and vainglory. Indeed Aquinas might say that pride has
so pernicious an effect on human character precisely because it flourishes in
the dark, artfully playing a background and supporting role in the performance of wrong actions.
Second, while Aquinas recognizes that acts of pride can be acts directly
against God, he also thinks that pride and vainglory engender wrongs done
to other human beings-taking too much or credit for too much, slighting
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others to seem superior oneself, fighting, cleaving obstinately to one's own
opinion from a desire to win an argument. This is as true of pride that
contemns God as it is of pride that contemns man.
Third, this rich account of pride suggests ample reason for reckoning pride
a vice. Those who do not believe in God will abhor pride because it hurts the
proud and carries in its train contempt for one's fellow man. They will see
pride as a vice of ambition and domination that impoverishes the emotional
life and fathers a number of offenses against other human beings. Those who
do believe in God will share these sentiments, but have distinctively religious
reasons for wanting pride checked. They will believe that God takes offense
at all the wrongs pride engenders and will want to avoid the contempt for
God and for His commands that pride sometimes entails. The religious and
the non-religious can overlap in their condemnation of pride as Aquinas
explicates it, though the religious have additional reasons for curbing that
vice.
What I earlier alluded to as the Miltonian picture of pride as willful attempts to usurp God's place has important implications for political theory.
That pride so understood is the worst of wrongs is a claim that might seem,
and has seemed to many, to stand in no need of justification. And, it might
be thought, it is this claim and the Miltonian view of pride that together
support Augustine's view that a primary function of political authority is the
humbling of those subject to it.
Judith Shklar has argued that political liberalism must reject this Augustinian view of political authority and the claims about pride that support it. 25 It
is essential to liberalism, she argues, to ignore the deadly sins identified by
Patristic and medieval Christianity and to deplore instead the vices she, following Montaigne, dubs "ordinary." Cruelty, treachery, snobbery and betrayal
are, she intimates, more ordinary than the deadly sins in three senses. First,
they are ubiquitous vices. Everyone can lapse into them because they do not
demand the great strength of character that Satan's rebellion required, the
knowing defiance of God. Second, they are vices the acts of which are
directed against other creatures rather than against the creator. Finally, the
claim that the acts these vices engender are wrong requires no justification
beyond pointing out that they visit harm on other creatures.
Of the ordinary vices, Shklar argues, cruelty must be reckoned the worst
because pain and the fear of pain are the worst harms humans can inflict on
each other. Since to be a liberal is to be concerned with the ordinary and not
the deadly vices, liberals "put cruelty first," hate it most of all and deny that
political authority should be concerned with pride's restraint. Indeed the
hatred of cruelty, Shklar argues, provides the most compelling reason to be
a liberal for it is definitive of liberal regimes to shun state-sponsored cruelty.
On the other hand, she argues, the Christian hatred of pride gives little reason
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to endorse a liberal politics: history testifies that those who hate pride and
not cruelty most of all often resort to "pious cruelty" to restrain offenses to
God. 26
Perhaps a novel or film in which characters exemplify pride and vainglory
would better bring these vices to life than does Aquinas's discussion of them.
Philip Quinn has argued that readers of Albert Camus's The Fall, for example,
gain direct and vivid acquaintance with pride through the self-revelation of
the novel's protagonist, the judge-penitent. 27 But if Aquinas's analysis lacks
the vividness and impact of a great novel, his discussion of pride, vainglory
and their offspring can still do much to refine our moral categories and
sharpen our moral perceptions. Certainly his discussion provides a picture of
pride that is far more subtlely shaded and finely grained than is the Miltonian
portrait of that vice that Shklar's argument takes for granted. Indeed the
picture of pride Aquinas sketches is of a subject quite "ordinary" in its
potential for motivating wrongs done to others.
Pride as Augustine and Aquinas understand it is first of all ordinary in its
commonness. It is a vice, they would maintain, that motivates a wide variety
of human acts in a wide variety of human beings. The knowing rebellion of
Satan may have required extraordinary strength, but the ordinary pride and
vainglory of everyday life do not. It is also an ordinary vice in that many acts
of pride are acts directed in the first instance against other human beings and
not against God. They are often motivated by contempt for other creatures
or by a desire for superiority over them. Those who regard harm done to other
creatures as ipso facto wrong therefore have reason to think pride a vice.
Pride's ordinariness thus far understood does not, however, imply that
concern with pride supplements the reasons those who put cruelty first have
to be liberals. More important, it does not imply that those who put pride first
have, in their abhorrence of pride, some reason to be political liberals. I want
now to argue, therefore, that embracing political liberalism in what I have
called "maturely pluralistic" societies helps contain or ameliorate the vice of
pride. Those who are concerned with pride, whether for religious or secular
reasons, have reason to accept liberal constraints on their political argument.

III
Aquinas's Augustinian account of pride, vainglory and the vices associated
with each provides a helpful guide to the temptations posed by engagement
in any kind of argument. Arguments can, after all, be highly competitive
affairs and the winners often enjoy a sense of their own superiority. Sometimes too they enjoy the acknowledgement of their intellectual superiority by
the vanquished or their auditors. Undue attachment to these spoils of victory
can lead one to argue for the wrong reasons, to endorse bad arguments, to
refuse to listen to the interlocutor. This is no doubt why Aquinas numbered
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the argumentative vices of contention, discord and pertinacity among the
daughters of vainglo~y.
Temptation can be especially strong in political argument, for the winners
of political argument can enjoy rewards that are especially attractive. Among
the spoils that go to the victor are political power and acknowledgement of
power exercised by oneself or by a group to which one gives allegiance. By
moving one to intransigence and pertinacity, undue attachment to these goods
can severely hinder the sort of consensus-building that subsequent social
cooperation requires.
The restraint demanded by political liberalism is one effective check on
these manifestations of pride. Liberal principles of political legitimacy impose restrictions on the reasons that can be offered to justify or advocate the
use of public power and do so precisely to foster the civility of argument
threatened by unrestrained pride, contentiousness and discord. 28 To the extent
that simply barring certain reasons from political argument makes that argument more civil, consensus-building is advanced and intransigence and pertinacity are curbed.
An interest in civil political argument motivated by attachment to social
goods rather than individual domination provides a reason for restraining
pride and endorsing liberalism that anyone can accept, whether Christian or
not. It is, however, a reason that should have special purchase on Christians,
at least on Christians sympathetic to Augustine's discussions of original sin
and its effects. These Christians should, as a result of their sympathy with
Augustine, already be sensitive to their own undue attraction to the prospect
of dominating others and aware of their need to curb it. Aquinas's treatment
of pride brings home the facts that this attraction can subvert any argument
and that the goods available in political argument pose a special temptation.
Liberalism, insofar as it fosters habitually restrained pursuit of victory in
argument, fosters habitual restraints on the desire to dominate others. It
should therefore seem especially attractive to Christians Augustinian in their
view of original sin.
Moreover, recall that Aquinas's analysis warns us of hypocrisy by including
it among the likely consequences of vainglory. That hypocrisy could ultimately be rooted in pride seems a plausible piece of moral psychology. The
proud person, Aquinas says, is inclined to attribute to herself goods, including
moral goods, that she does not have; the vainglorious person seeks a reputation for goodness of one sort or another. The hypocrite ties pride to vainglory
by trying to secure a reputation for qualities pride leads her to affect or
exaggerate. The religious hypocrite wants to be known for religious goodsfor a sanctity, a closeness to God or a religious uprightness-that she does
not possess. Argument, including political argument, provides an occasion
for religious hypocrisy by providing the opportunity for seeming to argue
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from religious motives that one really does not have or that are not as strong
as one would like others to believe. Robert Audi's especially strong form of
liberalism forbids political argument from religious motives. Adherence to
Audi's liberalism therefore has in its favor that it removes the near occasion
of religious hypocrisy. Adherence even to a weaker form of liberalism, one
that forbade appeal to religious reasons in political argument, would also
remove the occasion of religious hypocrisy since political argument would
not afford the opportunity to show allegiance to a religious position.
The disruption of political argument may seem an obvious way in which
pride poses political problems; at least it is obvious once Aquinas's association of pride with vainglory and the argumentative vices is before us. There
are other areas in which Aquinas's Augustinian account of pride is a more
valuable guide because it points out dangers we might have been prone to
overlook. It is here that Christians and non-Christians part company, for in
what follows I shall be especially concerned with temptations to pride that
politics poses for Christians and with the helpfulness of Aquinas's discussion
in indicating where those temptations lie.
These dangers arise when Christians engaged in political argument appeal
to the whole truth as they see it. They arise, for example, when Christians
argue from religious reasons for public policy that they think is required by
their Christian commitments, that they think is necessary to make their society a Christian one or one in which they think themselves best able to lead
a Christian life. The danger pride poses to such arguments is not only, as in
the cases discussed earlier, that it can lead one to continue the argument for
the wrong reasons or that argument will break down because of the pride of
those involved. Adopting and adducing religious reasons for religiously-inspired political positions can themselves be acts of pride. The Christian and
the non-Christian can overlap in or concur on the need to hold pride in check
because of its adverse political consequences; the Christian, however, has
further religious motivations to restrain her pride since she knows that it
offends God.
The first of the species of pride Aquinas distinguishes is that of imputing
to oneself goods, especially moral or spiritual goods, that one does not really
possess. This species includes, presumably, imputing to oneself moral or
spiritual goods that one cannot or ought not have, but which belong only to
God. Such arrogance is clear in the advocacy of perfectionist political projects, projects in which political power would be employed to eradicate sin
or to impose on human beings political institutions that their fallen nature
makes it impossible to sustain. 29 Only God could make the fundamental
changes in fallen human nature necessary for the maintenance of these institutions, and it would be an act of pride for human beings to suppose they
could do so. Moreover, many defenders of religious liberty have argued that
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religious faith is a gift from God and that it cannot be compelled even by
political coercion or the threat of repression. It seems to follow from these
claims that advocating attempts to coerce belief is an act of pride because it
is an attempt-often unwitting-to do what only God can do.
But the advocacy of less radical political programs can also be an act of
pride. Those who believe themselves chosen by God as His instruments to
purify society or to rid it of features that seem contrary to the demands of
Christianity, for example, are sometimes moved to advocate the use of public
power to eliminate what they find objectionable. The belief that one has been
chosen as a Divine instrument tempts one to think that God has done so
because of one's own spiritual worthiness for the purpose, to think that one
enjoys special favor with Him or a special proximity to Him. It tempts, that
is, to attribute to oneself a spiritual or moral good that one cannot be sure
one has and, sometimes, a good that one does not have. Insofar as beliefs and
desires connected with these mistaken attributions motivate political advocacy, that advocacy is an act of pride.
A similar invitation to pride lies in the belief that America is a country
especially favored by God or one in which the Biblical prophecies concerning
Israel are to be fulfilled. These beliefs enjoy some contemporary currency
and have a long history in popular American political thought and culture. 30
They are beliefs that can and have in the past motivated political advocacy
for they can lead and have in the past led some to suppose that they should
function as God's instruments to help America fulfill the purposes He has for
it. I have already discussed how advocacy motivated by belief that one is
God's instrument can be an act of pride.
Finally, determining what policies a well-functioning political society requires is obviously extremely complicated. Drawing from a religiously-based
conception of a well-lived human life political values, principles of justice
or specific public policies for a society composed in part of those who do not
share that religious view is extremely difficult. That difficulty results in part
from the fact that drawing such implications requires a significant amount of
political theory. Even if one's religious view straightforwardly implies the
immorality of acts of a certain kind, for example, a great deal of argument is
required to support the conclusion that such acts should be legally prohibited.
This argument must take up some of the thorniest questions of political
theory: those concerning the nature and functions of law and of political
authority.
Political advocacy based solely on one's religious view can be an act of
pride if accompanied by failure to acknowledge both one's own fallibility in
very difficult matters of political theory and practical politics. Christians who
accept a doctrine of the Fall ought to be especially worried about pride of
this sort. That doctrine is often taken to imply that human capacity to delib-
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erate about moral truth is hindered or impaired, and that self-interest and the
desire for power often impede moral reasoning. The more difficult forms of
reasoning, about practical politics and other matters far removed from the
substance of revelation, might seem to be especially imperiled. In these areas,
Christians ought to be most sensitive to their readiness to believe that, far
from being corrupted by original sin, they have special facility in political
reasoning that absolves them of the need to take seriously the arguments of
others. They ought, that is, to be especially sensitive to their propensity to
pride in these cases.
I have adduced a number of reasons for thinking that resort to religious
grounds in political argument can be an act of pride. I have thereby adduced
a number of reasons Christians might have for being political liberals. How
compelling those reasons are depends, of course, on whether the political
benefits of religiously-based argument outweigh the risk of pride such argument poses. Many Christians, perhaps, believe that the potential results of
such political arguments do outweigh the attendant dangers. They deem their
reliance on religious argument necessary to outlaw abortion and pornography,
and to achieve racial and economic justice. These results, they may think,
would be so great that they will or should run the risk of pride in order to
secure them.
This line of anti-liberal reasoning depends on the supposition that the only
arguments available to support the policies Christians favor are religious
arguments. It is worth recalling, however, that the political theory of liberal
democracy is over three centuries old and has been articulated in an atmosphere of intellectual and political freedom. Indeed this long history of development under reasonably favorable intellectual conditions accounts for the
maturity of the pluralism I discussed earlier.
As a result, liberal democratic theory is by now extremely well-developed
and contains ample resources for the criticism of extant regimes that purport
to realize liberal and democratic ideals. Certainly the theory of liberal democracy has sufficient conceptual resources to criticize institutions and practices of racial injustice. It therefore has sufficient resources on which to base
arguments for policies to implement racial equality. Perhaps Rawls's greatest
contribution to the political philosophy of liberal democracy is that of drawing out its implications for the just distribution of income and wealthY
Rawls's work thus testifies to the availability of arguments for economic
justice that are "internal" to liberal democratic theory. Susan Moller Okin
argues that a commitment to liberal democracy has profound implications for
the division of labor within the family.32 John Courtney Murray argued that
it required public funding of parochial schools. 33
The diverse implications that ideals of liberal democracy have been taken
to have holds out the possibility that Christians can mine those ideals for
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arguments supporting the public policies they favor. There may be limits to
what arguments Christians can find in liberal democratic theory; perhaps
arguments for the illegality of all abortions, for example, will not be forthcoming. But given Christian abhorrence of pride, Christians would do better
to look for and employ such arguments than to run the risk of pride that
religiously-based political argument poses.

IV
I have argued that acts of religiously inspired political advocacy-of the
use of political power to coerce belief, to purify society or make it more
Christian-are often acts of pride. Liberalism requires limiting the range of
values and principles to which political advocacy appeals; compliance with
at least some liberal principles of political advocacy would preclude political
arguments premised on the purposes God has for America or on His use of
some people as instruments in doing His will. Political liberalism therefore
prevents acts of pride that take the form of religiously inspired advocacy
appealing to such premises.
But can liberalism do more than preclude acts of pride? Can it develop
habits of mind and sentiment that mollify the vice of pride itself? Liberal
democracy fosters citizens' self-assertion and sense of self-worth; that it does
so is often thought one of its strengths. The self-assertion and -respect that
liberal democracy fosters are sometimes believed to be at odds with the
quality of humility. It might therefore seem that humility, the opposite of
pride, is a quality of character incompatible with the habits elicited by liberal
democracy.
Certainly liberalism is incompatible with habits of servility or excessive
acquiescence toward other human beings. 34 Countering the pride I located in
religiously inspired political advocacy does not, however, require a humility
so abject. Rather, such pride could be effectively contained by coming to
respect other citizens as reasonable: as capable of deliberating well about
what conception of a good life to pursue and as capable of participating in
political argument and honoring the demands of justice. 35 This respect for
others as reasonable suffices to contain the pride discussed earlier because
the various forms of political advocacy I discussed were all, insofar as they
were acts of pride, motivated by the belief in or desire for superiority to
citizens who do not share one's religious views. Advocacy of paternalistic
policies is motivated in part by the conviction that other citizens cannot
determine what is for their own good; other forms of advocacy are motivated
by the presumptuous supposition of nearer proximity to God than one's fellow. But there is no reason to think curbing these beliefs and desires requires
abject humility before other human beings; their replacement by beliefs and
desires associated with respect for other citizens as reasonable would suffice.
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To show that liberalism fosters the requisite respect, I borrow arguments from
John Rawls. 36
The discipline liberalism imposes on political argument requires that someone advocating the use of public power, from whatever motive religious or
otherwise, try to cast her arguments in terms that others could accept even
without accepting her religious views. This requires an exercise of the moral
imagination, an attempt to imagine what it would be like to lack our own
religious reasons to accept the position in question. Regular exercise of the
moral imagination to ascertain the reasons and motives of another, regularly
putting ourselves in another's place, as it were, should over time lead us to
an appreciation of others' ability to grasp and act on moral reasons and
political convictions. This appreciation, in tum, engenders our respect for
other citizens as moral agents capable of moral reasoning; it engenders, that
is, our respect for citizens as reasonableY
More important in the development of respect for other citizens is the
reciprocity of liberal political argument. First, if we repeatedly observe that
others too observe the strictures of political liberalism, we come to appreciate
how others are restraining themselves and trying to meet us halfway. When
political liberalism is long and generally adhered to, the recognition that
others restrain themselves and regard us as reasonable elicits reciprocity on
our part; it elicits, that is, our regard for them as reasonable. Second, that
others' adherence to political liberalism makes available goods we could not
otherwise realize reinforces our respect and good will toward them. Civility
of argument and the cooperation civility makes possible are important elements of the common good that would be very difficult to attain without the
adherence of all to the restraints liberalism imposes on political advocacy.
Seeing that others work to maintain the conditions of cooperation heightens
our regard for them as capable of reasonable participation in political argument. Seeing that they make possible some goods of which we avail ourselves
elicits or heightens our good will.
I have argued that dispositions associated with and motivating some acts
of pride can be ameliorated by the cultivation of respect for one's fellow
citizens as reasonable. I have further argued that the habit of respect for others
develops with continued and general adherence to political liberalism. But
while this respect may restrain pride, is it fittingly described as part of the
humility to which Christians aspire?
Christians must conclude that Augustinian liberalism is a politics with
limited ambitions. It does not claim that a liberal political regime can replace
pride with truly Christian humility before God. Nor does it claim that the
mutual respect liberalism engenders comes to fruition in a Christian love of
neighbor. It aims only at inculcating habits that hold pride and contempt in
check. Christians who want more humility than this must seek it in the
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revelation of Divine greatness and in the practices of their churches. Thus
Augustinian liberalism at best reinforces or prepares the way for the humility
Christians must learn elsewhere. Its limited ambitions should not, however,
be held against it, for in this Augustinian liberalism is consonant with
Augustine's own views. No one was more pessimistic than Augustine about
reliance on political authority to do more than hold pride in check or to foster
genuine moral improvement. 38
Non-Christians and the non-religious too will find Augustinian liberalism
limited in its ambitions. I have employed Rawlsian arguments to claim that
liberalism checks pride by fostering mutual respect. I have not, however,
argued for Rawlsian liberalism nor have I claimed that curbing pride requires
the high level of mutual respect that would characterize Rawls's well-ordered
society or Kant's realm of ends.
I have expressed disagreement with Judith Shklar on a number of points.
It might now be helpful to indicate a point on which we concur. Shklar's
defense of liberalism rests on her argument that the habits of liberalism best
discipline our indulgence in the ordinary vices, especially cruelty. Hers is a
liberalism of limited moral aspirations that focuses on the evils restrained
rather than on the virtues elicited. In this I have followed her lead, arguing
that political liberalism can hold pride in check even if it cannot foster true
humility. It is a liberalism that should appeal to all who reckon pride a vice,
but should have special appeal to Christians, who follow Augustine in abhorring it most of all.
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